Ulysses S. Grant's Memoirs The Mexican War
Chapter 9 Political Intrigue -- Buena Vista -- Movement Against Vera Cruz -- Siege And Capture Of Vera Cruz
The Mexican War was a political war, and the administration conducting it
desired to make party capital out of it. General Scott was at the head of
the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional capacity, his
claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost indisputable and
does not seem to have been denied by President Polk, or [William L.] Marcy,
his Secretary of War. Scott was a Whig and the administration was democratic.
General Scott was also known to have political aspirations, and nothing so
popularizes a candidate for high civil positions as military victories. It
would not do therefore to give him command of the "army of conquest." The
plans submitted by Scott for a campaign in Mexico were disapproved by the
administration, and he replied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful,
to the effect that, if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the
administration, success could not be expected. This was on the 27th of May,
1846 [May 21]. Four days later General Scott was notified that he need not
go to Mexico. General [Edmund P.] Gaines was next in rank, but he was too
old and feeble to take the field. Colonel Zachary Taylor -- a brigadier-general
by brevet -- was therefore left in command. He, too, was a Whig, but was not
supposed to entertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the
fall of Monterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the Whig papers
at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the Presidency.
Something had to be done to neutralize his growing popularity. He could not
be relieved from duty in the field where all his battles had been victories:
the design would have been too transparent. It was finally decided to send
General Scott to Mexico in chief command, and to authorize him to carry out
his own original plan: that is, capture Vera Cruz and march upon the capital
of the country. It was no doubt supposed that Scott's ambition would lead
him to slaughter Taylor or destroy his chances for the Presidency, and yet
it was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure
the prize.
The administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. It was
engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful issue,
or the political object would be unattained. Yet all the capable officers
of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man selected for
his lack of political ambition [Taylor] had himself become a prominent candidate
for the Presidency. It was necessary to destroy his chances promptly. The
problem was to do this without the loss of conquest and without permitting
another general of the same political party to acquire like popularity. The
fact is, the administration of Mr. Polk made every preparation to disgrace
Scott, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him to such desperation that
he would disgrace himself.
General Scott had opposed conquest by the way
of the Rio Grande, Matamoras and Saltillo from the first. Now that he was
in command of all the forces in Mexico, he withdrew from Taylor most of his
regular troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold
the line then in possession of the invading army. Indeed Scott did not deem
it important to hold anything beyond the Rio Grande, and authorized Taylor
to fall back to that line if he chose. General Taylor protested against the
depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon Buena Vista would
indicate that he did not share the views of his chief in regard to the
unimportance of conquest beyond the Rio Grande.
Scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to capture
Vera Cruz and to march on the capital of the country, two hundred and sixty
miles in the interior. He was promised all he asked and seemed to have not
only the confidence of the President, but his sincere good wishes. The promises
were all broken. Only about half the troops were furnished that had been
pledged, other war material was withheld and Scott had scarcely started for
Mexico before the President undertook to supersede him by the appointment
of Senator Thomas II. Benton [of Missouri] as lieutenant-general. This being
refused by Congress, the President asked legislative authority to place a
junior over a senior of the same grade, with the view of appointing Benton
to the rank of major-general and then placing him in command of the army,
but Congress failed to accede to this proposition as well, and Scott remained
in command: but every general appointed to serve under him was politically
opposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile.
General Scott reached Brazos Santiago or Point Isabel, at the mouth of the
Rio Grande, late in December, 1846, and proceeded at once up the river to
Camargo, where he had written General Taylor to meet him. Taylor, however,
had gone to, or towards Tampico [to Victoria], for the purpose of establishing
a post there. He had started on this march before he was aware of General
Scott being in the country. Under these circumstances Scott had to issue
his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn from Taylor, without the
personal consultation he had expected to hold with his subordinate.
General Taylor's victory at Buena Vista, February 22d, 23d, and 24th, 1847
[Santa Anna had fled by the 24th], with an army composed almost entirely
of volunteers who had not been in battle before, and over a vastly superior
force numerically, made his nomination for the Presidency by the Whigs a
foregone conclusion. He was nominated and elected in 1848. I believe that
he sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace afforded
by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the highest office
in the gift of any people, the Presidency of the United States.
When General Scott assumed command of the army of invasion, I was in the
division of General David Twiggs, in Taylor's command; but under the new
orders my regiment was transferred to the division of General William Worth,
in which I served to the close of the war. The troops withdrawn from Taylor
to form part of the forces to operate against Vera Cruz, were assembled at
the mouth of the Rio Grande preparatory to embarkation for their
destination. [More than 4,700 men were taken from Taylor's command and sent to Scott through the port at Tampico. These were the troops of Generals Robert Patterson, David Twiggs and John A. Quitman. General Worth, with Grant, went north to the Rio Grande to join Scott. This left Taylor with about 4,700 men, largely volunteers, who had fought at Buena Vista. R. S. Henry: The Story of the Mexican War; Mansfield.] I found General Worth a different man from any I had before served directly under. He was
nervous, impatient and restless on the march, or when important or responsible
duty confronted him. There was not the least reason for haste on the march,
for it was known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at
the point of our embarkation to carry the army, but General Worth moved his
division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been going
to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. The length of the marches was regulated
by the distances between places affording a supply of water for the troops,
and these distances were sometimes long and sometimes short. General Worth
on one occasion at least, after having made the full distance intended for
the day, and after the troops were in camp and preparing their food, ordered
tents struck and made the march that night which had been intended for the
next day. Some commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance
out of them without fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days
without accomplishing so much. General Worth belonged to this latter class.
He enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus
attached his officers and men to him.
The army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of the mouth
of the Rio Grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of transports to
carry it to its new field of operations. The transports were all sailing
vessels. The passage was a tedious one, and many of the troops were on shipboard
over thirty days from the embarkation at the mouth of the Rio Grande to the
time of debarkation south of Vera Cruz. The trip was a comfortless one for
officers and men. The transports used were built for carrying freight and
possessed but limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added
to the discomfort of all.
The transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of Anton Lizardo,
some sixteen miles south of Vera Cruz, as they arrived, and there awaited
the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition, and supplies
of all kinds from the North. With the fleet there was a little steam propeller
dispatch-boat--the first vessel of the kind I had ever seen, and probably
the first of its kind ever seen by any one then with the army. At that day
ocean steamers were rare, and what there were were side-wheelers. This little
vessel, going through the fleet so fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller
under water out of view attracted a great deal of attention. I recollect
that lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom I happened to
be standing on the deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed,
"Why, the thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances."
Finally on the 7th of March, 1847, the little army of ten
or twelve thousand men, given Scott to invade a country with a population
of seven or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest
possible natural advantages for defense, was all assembled and ready to commence
the perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea.
The debarkation took place inside of the little island of Sacrificios, some
three miles south of Vera Cruz. The vessels could not get anywhere near shore,
so that everything had to be landed in lighters or surf-boats; General Scott
had provided these before leaving the North. The breakers were sometimes
high, so that the landing was tedious. The men were got ashore rapidly, because
they could wade when they came to shallow water; but the camp and garrison
equipage, provisions, ammunition and all stores had to be protected from
B the salt water, and therefore their landing took several days. The Mexicans
were very kind to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing
except an occasional shot from their nearest fort. During the debarkation
one shot took off the head of Major Albertis. No other, I believe, reached
anywhere near the same distance. On the 9th of March the troops were landed
and the investment of Vera Cruz, from the Gulf of Mexico south of the city
to the Gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected. The landing
of stores was continued until everything was got ashore.
Vera Cruz, at the time of which I write and up to 1880, was a walled city.
The wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the water again
on the north. There were fortifications at intervals along the line and at
the angles. In front of the city, and on an island half a mile out in the
Gulf, stands San Juan de Ulloa, an enclosed fortification of large
dimensions and great strength for that period. Against artillery of the present
day the land forts and walls would prove elements of weakness rather than
strength. After the invading army had established their camps out of range
of the fire from the city, batteries were established, under cover of night,
far to the front of the line where the troops lay. These batteries were
entrenched and the approaches sufficiently protected. If a sortie had been
made at any time by the Mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have
been quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's
main line. No serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to drive
our troops away.
The siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of March,
by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall surrounding
the city. Upon this General Morales, who was Governor of both the city and
of San Juan de Ulloa, commenced a correspondence with General Scott looking
to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison. [On March 25 various foreign consuls in Vera Cruz appealed to Scott for a suspension of hostilities. Mexican negotiators and the Americans arrived at terms on March 27. General Juan Morales, commander of the city, was allegedly sick and General Jose Juan de Landero was in command at thesurrenderr. Henry.]On the 29th Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa were occupied by Scott's army. About five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of artillery, besides large amounts of small arms
and ammunition, fell into the hands of the victorious force. [About 4,000 Mexican prisoners surrendered at Vera Cruz. Henry.] The casualties on our side during the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded.
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