Ulysses S. Grant's Memoirs The Mexican War
Chapter 10 March To Jalapa -- Battle Of Cerro Gordo -- Perote -- Puebla -- Scott And Taylor
General Scott had less than twelve thousand men at Vera Cruz. He had been
promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimed that
he had, and he was a man of veracity. Twelve thousand was a very small army
with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an enemy's country,
and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of largely over one hundred
thousand inhabitants. Then, too, any line of march that could be selected
led through mountain passes easily defended. In fact, there were at that
time but two roads from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico that could be taken
by an army; one by Jalapa and Perote, the other by Cordova and Orizaba, the
two coming together on the great plain which extends to the City of Mexico
after the range of mountains is passed.
It was very important to get the army away from Vera Cruz as soon as possible,
in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually visits that
city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not acclimated; but
transportation, which was expected from the North, was arriving very slowly.
It was absolutely necessary to have enough to supply the army to Jalapa,
sixty-five miles in the interior and above the fevers of the coast. At that
point the country is fertile, and an army of the size of General Scott's
could subsist there for an indefinite period. Not counting the sick, the
weak and the garrisons for the captured city and fort, the moving column
was now less than ten thousand strong. This force was composed of three
divisions, under Generals Twiggs, Patterson, and Worth. The importance of
escaping the vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could
be got together to move a division the advance was commenced. On the 8th
of April, Twiggs's division started for Jalapa. He was followed very soon
by Patterson, with his division. General Worth was to bring up the rear with
his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry six days'
rations for his troops with the necessary 4 ammunition and camp and garrison
equipage. It was the 13th of April before this division left Vera Cruz.
The leading division ran against the enemy at Cerro Gordo, some fifty miles
west, on the road to Jalapa, and went into camp at Plan del Rio, about three miles from the fortifications. General Patterson reached Plan del Rio with his division soon after Twiggs arrived. The two were then secure against an attack from Santa Anna, who commanded the Mexican forces.
At all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements and without
molestation, until the 18th of April. General Scott had remained at Vera
Cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the 12th, learning the
situation at the front, he hastened on to take personal supervision. He at
once commenced his preparations for the capture of the position held by Santa
Anna and of the troops holding it.
Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to fifteen
miles east of Jalapa, and Santa Anna had selected this point as the easiest
to defend against an invading army. The road, said to have been built by
Cortez, zigzags around the mountainside and was defended at every turn by
artillery. On either side were deep chasms or mountain walls. A direct attack
along the road was an impossibility. A flank movement seemed equally impossible.
After the arrival of the commanding-general upon the scene, reconnaissances
were sent out to find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's
works might be reached without a front attack. These reconnaissances were
made under the supervision of Captain Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenants P. G. T. Beauregard, Isaac I. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G. W. Smith, George B.
McClellan, and J. G. Foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who
attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict for
the preservation of the unity of the nation. The reconnaissance was completed,
and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of the enemy was
effected by the 17th of the month. This was accomplished without the knowledge
of Santa Anna or his army, and over ground where he supposed it impossible.
On the same day General Scott issued his order for the attack on the 18th.
The attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of the
Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an engagement were
nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place. Under the
supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened over chasms to the
right where the walls were so steep that men could barely climb them. Animals
could not. These had been opened under cover of night, without attracting
the notice of the enemy. The engineers, who had directed the opening, led
the way and the troops followed. Artillery was let down the steep slopes
by hand, the men engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting
the guns down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground
on top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course
of the piece. In like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the opposite
slopes. In this way Scott's troops reached their assigned position in rear
of most of the entrenchments of the enemy, unobserved. The attack was made,
the Mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty retreat, and those occupying
them surrendered. On the left General Pillow's command made a formidable
demonstration, which doubtless held a part of the enemy in his front and
contributed to the victory. I am not pretending to give full details of all
the battles fought, but of the portion that I saw. There were troops engaged
on both sides at other points in which both sustained losses; but the battle
was won as here narrated.
The surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some three
thousand prisoners fell into Scott's hands, also a large amount of ordnance
and ordnance stores. The prisoners were paroled, the artillery parked and
the small arms and ammunition destroyed. The battle of Buena Vista was probably
very important to the success of General Scott at Cerro Gordo and in his
entire campaign from Vera Cruz to the great plains, reaching to the City
of Mexico. The only army Santa Anna had to protect his capital and the mountain
passes west of Vera Cruz, was the one he had with him confronting General
Taylor. It is not likely that he would have gone as far north as Monterey
to attack the United States troops when he knew his country was threatened
with invasion further south. When Taylor moved to Saltillo and then advanced
on to Buena Vista, Santa Anna crossed the desert confronting the invading
army, hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet General Scott
in the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz. His attack on Taylor was disastrous
to the Mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched his army to Cerro
Gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles by the line he had
to travel, in time to intrench himself well before Scott got there. If he
had been successful at Buena Vista his troops would no doubt have made a
more stubborn resistance at Cerro Gordo. Had the battle of Buena Vista not
been fought Santa Anna would have had time to move leisurely to meet the
invader further south and with an army not demoralized nor depleted by defeat.
After the battle the victorious army moved on to Jalapa, where it was in
a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the
coast. Jalapa, however, is still in the mountain, and between there and the
great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence. It was important,
therefore, to get possession of the great highway between the sea-coast and
the capital up to the point where it leaves the mountains, before the enemy
could have time to reorganize and fortify in our front. Worth's division
was selected to go forward to secure this result. The division marched to
Perote on the great plain, not far from where the road debouches from the
mountains. There is a low, strong fort on the plain in front of the town,
R known as the Castle of Perote. This, however, offered no resistance and
fell into our hands, with its armament.
General Scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of Vera Cruz,
and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire, a long
delay was the consequence. The troops were in a healthy climate, and where
they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line back to Vera
Cruz should be cut off. It being ascertained that the men whose time would
expire before the City of Mexico could possibly fall into the hands of the
American army, would not remain beyond the term for which they had volunteered,
the commanding-general determined to discharge them at once, for a delay
until the expiration of their time would have compelled them to pass through
Vera Cruz during the season of the vomito. This reduced Scott's force in
the field to about five thousand men.
Early in May, Worth, with his division, left Perote and marched onto
Puebla. The roads were wide and the country open except through one pass
in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the road runs.
Notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two bodies, moving
a day apart. Nothing occurred on the march of special note, except that while
lying at the town of Amozoque--an easy day's march east of Puebla--a body
of the enemy's cavalry, two or three thousand strong, was seen to our right,
not more than a mile away. A battery or two, with two or three infantry
regiments, was sent against them and they soon disappeared. On the 15th of
May we entered the city of Puebla.
General Worth was in command at Puebla until the latter end of May, when
General Scott arrived. Here, as well as on the march up, his restlessness,
particularly under responsibilities, showed itself. During his brief command
he had the enemy hovering around near the city, in vastly superior numbers
to his own. The brigade to which I was attached changed quarters three different
times in about a week, occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the
heart of the city; then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east.
On one occasion General Worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day,
with three days' cooked rations in their haversacks. He galloped from one
command to another proclaiming the near proximity of Santa Anna with an army
vastly superior to his own. General Scott arrived upon the scene the latter
part of the month, and nothing more was heard of Santa Anna and his myriads.
There were, of course, bodies of mounted Mexicans hovering around to watch
our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies of troops, if they
ventured too far out. These always withdrew on the approach of any considerable
number of our soldiers. After the arrival of General Scott I was sent, as
quartermaster, with a large train of wagons, back two days' march at least,
to procure forage. We had less than a thousand men as escort and never thought
of danger. We procured full loads for our entire train at two plantations,
which could easily have furnished as much more.
There had been great delay in obtaining the authority of Congress for the
raising of the troops asked for by the administration. A bill was before
the National Legislature from early in the session of 1846-7, authorizing
the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be attached to the
regular army, but it was the middle of February before it became a law.
Appointments of commissioned officers had then to be made; men had to be
enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole transported to Mexico. It
was August before General Scott received reinforcement sufficient to warrant
an advance. His moving column, not even now more than ten thousand strong,
was in four divisions, commanded by Generals Twiggs, Worth, Pillow and Quitman. There was also a cavalry corps under General [William S.] Harney,
composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d dragoons. The advance commenced
on the 7th of August with Twiggs's division in front. The remaining three
divisions followed, with an interval of a day between. The marches were short,
to make concentration easier in case of attack.
I had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting armies
in a foreign land. The contrast between the two was very marked. General
Taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for comfort. He moved
about the field in which he was operating to see through his own eyes the
situation. Often he would be without staff officers, and when he was accompanied
by them there was no prescribed order in which they followed. He was very
much given to sit his horse side-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly
on the battlefield. General Scott was the reverse in all these particulars.
He always wore all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected
his lines; word would be sent to all divisions and brigade commanders in
advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be
expected. This was done so that all the army might be under arms to salute
their chief as he passed. On these occasions he wore his dress uniform, cocked
hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs. His staff proper, besides all officers
constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc.,
that could be spared--followed, also in uniform and in prescribed order.
Orders were prepared with great care and evidently with the view that they
should be a history of what followed.
In their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted quite
as strongly as in their other characteristics. General Scott was precise
in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of his rhetoric;
not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third person, and he could
bestow praise upon the person he was talking about without the least
embarrassment. Taylor was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could
put his meaning so plainly that there could be no mistaking it. He knew how
to express what he wanted to say in the fewest well-chosen words, but would
not sacrifice meaning to the construction of high-sounding sentences. But
with their opposite characteristics both were great and successful soldiers;
both were true, patriotic, and upright in all their dealings. Both were pleasant
to serve under--Taylor was pleasant to serve with. Scott saw more through
the eyes of his staff officers than through his own. His plans were deliberately
prepared, and fully expressed in orders. Taylor saw for himself, and gave
orders to meet the emergency without reference to how they would read in
history.
|