About three-fourths of the line officers were graduates of West Point. The officers of the Adjutant- General's, Quartermaster's, and Ordnance departments and also those of the Engineer Corps and of the Topographical Engineers were nearly all graduates, but there were none among the general officers at that time.

The Regular Army of that day gave very little attention to merely showy exercises, but for purposes of campaign and battle was unexcelled, if not unequaled.

The cavalry was well mounted, disciplined, and trained. The artillery was thoroughly instructed some as light batteries, but most of it as infantry. The infantry also, like the other arms, was thoroughly trained in the drill and battle tactics of that period. The most casual reader can not fail to be impressed with the thorough knowledge of their arm and its possibilities and correct use on the battlefield exhibited by even the junior officers in the very first battle of the war.

Such skill and readiness to seize the passing advantages offered by the phases of the fight are of inestimable value on the battlefield, but they are intuitive with very few. Through this can be seen the advantage of a good military education, whether obtained at the miliary academy or in the school of practical experience. Hence the high estimation in which these men were held by both Generals Scott and Taylor, both of whom were honor graduates of the school of experience as well as men of great natural ability and of the highest character.

For all purposes of active service our Regulars were equal to any in existence, with the exception that they were not accustomed to maneuvering or working in masses, very few of them ever having seen more than a few companies assembled. But the theory of larger operations had been carefully studied by a great majority of the officers, and the troops soon became accustomed to working together in such masses as were necessary. Almost invariably the conduct of all our troops, both Regulars and Volunteers, was above all praise. The skill, gallantry and dogged determination with which they overcame the tremendous odds of every kind against them vast numerical superiority, powerful works armed with heavy guns, and the terrors of unfamiliar deadly climates surpassed all reasonable expectation.

After hostilities began, the Army was augmented by volunteers, enlisted at first "for one year", and later, when the folly of this approach was demonstrated, "for the war". Fortunately there was available a great abundance of most excellent material, entirely similar to their predecessors of 1812. Even with the short time possible for organization and training, these volunteers repeatedly showed themselves superior in battle to the enemy's best troops. A number of graduates were given volunteer commissions and their work in organization, discipline, and drill was of great value. That they labored faithfully and effectively is the universal testimony, and while many of the survivors received brevets for gallantry in action, their proportion of killed and wounded is more eloquent of their services on the battlefield than even the encomiums of their fellow-soldiers.

And in, perhaps, the most important of all respects, we were highly favored at this time in having generals of great skill, judgment, courage (both moral and physical), and experience. The American generalship was of a high order. Considered tactically, some minor errors, due probably to overconfidence, are perceived; but in most cases the principal dispositions will be approved by all. Considered, strategically, it may be said that General Taylor's dazzling victories could not be decisive because of his theater of operations. But the very cause and origin of the war compelled operations in that theater.

Criticisms of Winfield Scott's unbroken record of successful battles are in most cases merely captious. As his Government failed to properly support and supply him with men, animals, clothing, rations, transportation, and money, he was finally compelled to choose either indefinite inaction or the hazardous course which he preferred.

General Ulysses S. Grant, later Vice President of the Aztec Club, once pointed out:

"But General Scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. He invaded a populous country, penetrating 260 miles into the interior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed to him; he was without a base, the enemy was always intrenched, always on the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital and conquered the Government. Credit is due to the troops engaged it is true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's."

Our troops were always compelled to fight against odds. Their numbers in some cases were less than one-third those of the enemy, as at Buena Vista and in the valley of Mexico, and they never equaled him even when he occupied carefully fortified positions of great strength well supplied with artillery, such as Monterey, Cerro Gordo, Contreras, and the other powerful works in the valley. The skill of the officers, the tremendous moral force due to a succession of victories, and the sublime faith of the generals in their troops and of the troops in their generals, added to skill and courage, compensated for governmental neglect, the ultimate effect of which has been to make the splendor of their achievements still more dazzling.

The number of graduates who rendered distinguished services in the Mexican war is many times greater than the whole number who had graduated before 1812-13. The list of those who were "breveted for gallant and meritorious services" on the field of battle runs into the hundreds. Many were breveted twice and a number three times.

Brevets
Intended initially as a means of rewarding officers for meritorious combat service, the brevet was used during the moribund period of the 1820's-1840's as a means of honoring officers prevented from receiving promotion due to the lack of a military retirement system. With the number of senior line officers limited by law, and promotion only as vacancies occurred, the lack of a retirement system caused aged, infirm or inadequate officers to remain in grade years past their effectiveness, preventing younger, more deserving officers from moving up.

The brevet rank normally carried no greater authority or pay, but the officer could be ordered to duty in his brevet rank. Thus, although not holding rank in grade, a brevet rank permitted the officer to hold a post he otherwise could not have. Zachary Taylor took command of the Army of Observation as a Brevet Brigadier General. However, this dual track of ranks soon became quite confusing.  Jack Bauer writes:

 "One of the less productive avocations which the officers at Corpus Christi found to while away the time was to argue the brevet-lineal rank issue. In October Taylor had raised the issue because of the presence of the army of both Colonels Twiggs and Worth. Twiggs was senior to Worth as a colonel but the latter held a brevet as a brigadier general. Whoever was senior would be the second-in-command of the army. General Winfield Scott ruled in Worth's favor but Secretary Marcy took the issue to the President. Without waiting to learn Polk's decision, Taylor reversed Scott's ruling.

"This should have ended the dispute, since the President's ruling in March sustained the primacy of lineal rank. Unfortunately, Hitchcock, to whom such matters had much importance, muddied the waters in mid-December by forwarding to the Senate a memorial signed by over a hundred officers asking for legislation to settle the question. The issue came to a head when Taylor ordered a review of the army on February 25. He designated Twiggs as the senior officer, which caused Worth to refuse to participate and ask permission to leave the army. To save appearances, Taylor took advantage of a break in the weather to cancel the review. "When the news of Polk's decision reached Texas, Worth temper got the better of him and he resigned his commission, although he did not leave the army until it reached the Rio Grande. On May 9, when he learned of the developing hostilities, Worth withdrew his resignation, Scott ordered him back to the army, but he missed Palo Alto and Resaca-de-la-Palma."
[K. Jack Bauer The Mexican War, 1846-1848.  MacMillan Publishing Co., NY, 1974. p 35-36.]

A large number of the West Point graduates who served as junior officers in the Mexican War afterwards became prominent in the Civil War, and their names are today household words. Many of their biographies are well known to all Americans. A few references to some of their exploits during the Mexican War, as recounted in the official publication surrounding the centennial of West Point are highlighted below, drawn from: Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York., GPO, Washington, D. C., 1904.  Vol 1, pp 601-631.

Most of the officers mentioned below were members of the Aztec Club of 1847.  They have been highlighted with the addition of their first names in brackets [     ].

The great majority of our officers were thoroughly proficient in handling their own arms in conjunction with the other arms on the battlefield. This may be best illustrated by references to some of the battles of the war.

Palo Alto
At Palo Alto, while all the arms certainly did well, the battle was won almost entirely by the light artillery. The skill displayed by Major Ringgold, Captain [James] Duncan, and Lieutenants Churchill and Ridgely in handling their guns to the best advantage through all the phases of the action was highly extolled at the time and has been admired ever since. General Taylor reported:

"Our artillery, consisting of two 18-pounders and two light batteries, was the arm chiefly engaged, and to the excellent manner in which it was maneuvered and served our success is mainly due."

Edward D. Mansfield wrote:

"The continuous fire of artillery disordered and drove back the enemy's columns. On the left wing of our Army attacks of the Mexicans were met by Duncan's battery and by other troops of that division. The combat on our side was chiefly carried on by artillery, and never was there a more complete demonstration of the superior skill and energy of that arm of the service as conducted by the accomplished graduates of West Point. He who was the life and leader of the Light Artillery--Major Ringgold was, in this engagement, mortally wounded, and died in a few days."
[Edward D. Mansfield.  The Mexican War.  A. S. Barnes & Co., Cincinnati, Ohio.  1848, p 37.]

Resaca-de-la-Palma
Very early on the following morning, May 9, 1846, General Arista retired to a strong position at Resaca-de-la-Palma, where he received a reenforcement of 2,000 infantry and "a strong body of cavalry". Having posted his troops with much care, he was attacked by the Americans about 2 o'clock p.m. All arms participated with credit as before, but the chief glory of that day was justly awarded to Captain May and his squadron of dragoons, who charged and captured the Mexican batteries, which were much more effectively handled than on the previous day. Though they could not hold the guns nor bring them away, yet they were silenced, the general in command of them was captured, and, upon the advance of the American line, the whole Mexican army took to flight and was never again assembled north of the Rio Grande. General Taylor reported:

"Perceiving that no decisive advantage could be gained until this artillery was silenced, I ordered Captain May to charge the batteries with his squadron of dragoons. This was gallantly and effectively executed; the enemy was driven from his guns, and General La Vega, who remained alone at one of the batteries, was taken prisoner. The squadron, which suffered much in this charge, not being immediately supported by the infantry, could not retain possession of the artillery taken, but it was completely silenced."

Captain Mansfield, with others, again distinguished himself in the reconnaissance before the attacks upon the works of Monterey and in the battle also.

Monterey
The Battle of Monterey consisted of a series of severe combats (mostly assaults on the enemy's works) extending over three days, September 21 to 23, inclusive. Here the foot troops won the prize for distinguished and effective work. General [William J.] Worth, with his division, had been ordered to seize the Saltillo road and to attack the forts to the west of Monterey and to prevent a concentration of forces against him. A strong demonstration by large detachments from the main body was made before the eastern front. This speedily developed into an assault upon the forts, fortified houses, and intrenchments in that locality.

After a hard fight the main body of the attacking force was repulsed with heavy loss, but two companies of the 1st Infantry under Captain [Electus] Backus had captured a solidly constructed building suitable for defense, and being encumbered with wounded, held their ground and did not retreat with their regiment. Being isolated, they were under a heavy fire from all sides, but by superior marksmanship they held their position with great tenacity and silenced most of the fire against them, including that of a light battery, which lost many cannoneers and retired. Soon after, the Americans assaulted a neighboring work called "Fort Teueria". The assaulting troops had already lost a third of their strength and were about to retreat when Captain Backus, having completed a change of position, opened so telling a fire on the rear of Fort Teueria that the enemy wavered, whereupon the assault was renewed with entire success. By this exploit the Americans secured a footing in the fortifications of the east side of Monterey.

During this time and later General [William J.] Worth's command executed four very gallant attacks against superior numbers in positions of great natural and artificial strength. Colonel Childs carried Independence Hill and the Bishop's Palace, Captain [Charles F.] Smith carried Federaci¢n Hill, and General [Persifor F.] Smith carried Fort Soldado. Each of these exploits deserves a full description, but, like many other glorious acts, can not be noticed here.

Many were justly complimented on their soldier-like deeds, but General Howard said:

"Capt. Electus Backus, of the 1st Infantry, with Mansfield, became the brilliant point in these operations."

Vera Cruz
It having been decided to capture Vera Cruz and to advance from that base upon the capital city of the Mexican Republic, General Scott's army of 12,000 men was landed near the former place on March 9, and on the 12th the investment was completed. Progress was greatly delayed by violent northers, but the trenches were opened on the 18th, the bombardment began on the 22d, and the city and its famous castle surrendered on the 27th.

"Five thousand prisoners surrendered on parole; near 500 pieces of fine artillery taken; the best port of Mexico captured and possessed; and the famed Castle of San Juan, said to be impregnable, and which had been refitted and equipped in the best possible manner, yielded to the superior skill and energy of the Americans."
[Mansfield, op. cit., at 192.]

"The capture of Vera Cruz was an affair, in the main, of the staff and artillery. The engineers located and constructed the batteries with such good judgment and care that there were few casualties; the fixed ammunition used by the artillery was prepared under the direction of ordnance officers with a skill insured by their education and their experiments and labors in the laboratory. The infantry worked upon the trenches and batteries, and, as guards, gave protection and security day and night, while the latter were used, and, in addition, did picket duty in front and rear of the lines."
[Wilcox, Cadmus M. History of the Mexican War.  Church News Publishing Company, 1892.  p 261.]

It should be said, in addition, that Colonel [William S.] Harney, with the dragoons, beat off and dispersed the detachments that attempted annoyance from the outside.

In the entire operation the American loss in killed and wounded was 67. A Mexican historian says that their loss was 400 killed and 200 wounded.

General Scott's report contained many compliments, but we will notice only his remarks upon his fellow-soldier of 1812, whose services the General had especially requested, and who, under his orders, conducted the siege:

"In consideration of the great services of General Totten in the siege that has just terminated most successfully, and the importance of his presence at Washington as the head of the Engineer Bureau, I intrust this dispatch to his personal care, and beg to commend him to the very favorable consideration of the Department."

Cerro Gordo
On the 8th of April, ten days after the surrender of Vera Cruz, General [Winfield] Scott's army, though very short of transportation, began its march by divisions toward Jalapa. General [David E.] Twiggs, commanding the leading division, found the enemy at Cerro Gordo in such strength that he halted, April 11, at Plan del Rio to wait for reinforcements. During the six following days reconnaissance was very actively carried on, principally by engineer officers, suitably escorted. Basing himself on their reports, General Scott directed the opening of roads or trails leading through the dense chaparral and very rough broken ground toward several points of the enemy's line, while the latter industriously fortified their positions. On April 17 the general issued his celebrated order, describing the battle of the next day with almost perfect accuracy.

"The plan of the attack, sketched in General Orders III herewith, was finely executed by this gallant army before 2 o'clock p. m. yesterday. We are quite embarrassed with the results of victory--prisoners of war, heavy ordnance, field batteries, small arms, and accouterments. About 3,000 men laid down their arms, with the usual proportion of field and company officers, besides 5 generals, several of them of great distinction--Pinson, Jarrero, La Vega, Noryuga, and Obando. A sixth general, Vasquez, was killed in defending the battery (tower) in the rear of the line of defense, the capture of which gave us those glorious results. Our loss, though comparatively small in number, has been serious.

"Second Lieutenant Derby, Topographical Engineers, I saw also at the same place (tower) severely wounded; Captain Patten, 2d U. S. Infantry, lost his right hand. Major Sumner, 2d U. S. Dragoons, was slightly wounded the day before, and Captain [Joseph E.] Johnston, Topographical Engineers, (now Lieutenant-Colonel of infantry), was very severely wounded in reconnoitering some days earlier.

"A portion of the 1st Artillery under the often-distinguished Brevet-Colonel Childs, the 3d Infantry under Captain Alexander, the Seventh Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Plympton, and the Rifles under Major [William W.] Loring, all under the temporary command of Colonel [William S.] Harney, 2d Dragoons, composed that detachment. The style of execution which I had the pleasure to witness was most brilliant and decisive. The brigade ascended the long and difficult slope of Cerro Gordo, without shelter and under the tremendous fire of artillery and musketry, with the utmost steadiness, reached the breastworks, drove the enemy from them, planted the colors of the 1st Artillery, 3d and 7th Infantry, the enemy's flag still flying, and after some moments of sharp firing, finished the conquest with the bayonet. It is a most pleasing duty to say that the highest praise is due to Harney, Childs, Plympton, Loring, [Thomas L.] Alexander, their gallant officers and men, for this brilliant service independent of the great service which soon followed. [Winfield Scott's Report on the Battle of Cerro Gordo.]

". . .[David E.] Twiggs' division, reinforced by Shields's brigade of volunteers, was thrown into position on the 17th, and was of necessity drawn into action in taking up the ground for its bivouac and the opposing height for our heavy battery. It will be seen that many of our officers and men were killed or wounded in this sharp combat, handsomely commenced by a company of the Seventh Infantry under Brevet 1st Lieutenant Gardner, who is highly praised by all his commanders for signal services. Colonel [William S.] Harney, coming up with the Rifle Regiment and 1st Artillery (also parts of his brigade), brushed away the enemy and occupied the height on which, in the night, was placed a battery of one 24-pounder and two 24-pound howitzers under the supervision of Captain [Robert E.] Lee, Engineers, and Lieutenant [Peter V.] Hagner, Ordnance. These guns opened next morning, and were served with effect by Captain [Edward J.] Steptoe and Lieutenant [Hachaliah] Brown, 3d Artillery, Lieutenant [Peter V.] Hagner, Ordnance, and Lieutenant Seymour, 1st Artillery. The same night, with extreme toil and difficulty, under the superintendence of Lieutenant [Zealous B.] Tower, Engineers, and Lieutenant Laidley, Ordnance, one 8-inch howitzer was put in position across the river and opposite to the enemy's right battery.

". . .Early on the 18th the columns moved to the general attack, and our success was speedy and decisive.

". . .The moment the fate of the day was decided the cavalry and Taylor's and Wall's field batteries were pushed on toward Jalapa in advance of the pursuing columns of infantry.

"In hot pursuit many Mexicans were captured or slain before our men and horses were exhausted by the heat and distance.

"The rout proved to have been complete, the retreating army, except a small body of cavalry, being dispersed and utterly disorganized. The immediate consequences have been our possession of this important city, the abandonment of the works and artillery at La Hoya, the next formidable pass between Vera Cruz and the capital, and the prompt occupation by [William J.] Worth's division of the fortress of Perote (second only to San Juan d'Ulloa), with its extensive armament of 66 guns and mortars and its large supply of material.

"I have heretofore endeavored to do justice to the skill and courage with which the heights of Cerro Gordo were attacked, naming the regiments most distinguished, and their commanders, under the lead of Colonel [William S.] Harney. Lieut. [Gustavus W.] Smith led the engineer company as part of the storming force, and is noticed with distinction. The reports of this assault make favorable mention of many in which I can well concur, having witnessed the daring advance and perfect steadiness of the whole. Besides those already named, Lieutenant Brooks, 3rd Infantry; Lieutenant [Philip W.] Macdonald, 2d Dragoons; Lieutenant [Earl] Van Dorn, 7th Infantry (all acting staff officers); Captain [John B.] Magruder, 1st Artillery; and Lieutenant Gardner, 7th Infantry, seem to have won special praise.

". . .In expressing my indebtedness for able assistance--to Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcock, Acting Inspector-General; to Majors Smith and [William] Turnbull, respective Chiefs of Engineers and Topographical Engineers; to their assistant lieutenants Lieutenants Mason, [Pierre G. T.] Beauregard, Stevens, [Zealous B.] Tower, [Gustavus W.] Smith, [George B.] McClellan, Engineers; and Lieutenants Derby and [Edmund L.] Hardcastle, Topographical Engineers; to Captain [Robert] Allen, Chief Quartermaster, and Lieutenant [William B.] Blair, Chief Commissary, and to Lieutenants [Peter V.] Hagner and Laidley, Ordnance, all actively employed I am compelled to make special mention of the services of Capt. R. E. Lee, Engineers. This officer greatly distinguished himself at the siege of Vera Cruz, was again indefatigable during these operations, in reconnaissance as daring as laborious, and of the utmost value. Nor was he less conspicuous in planting batteries and in conducting columns to their stations under the heavy fire of the enemy. My personal staff Lieutenants [Henry L.] Scott, Williams, and [George W.] Lay, and Major [Abraham] Van Buren, who volunteered for the occasion gave me zealous and efficient assistance. Our whole force present, in action and in reserve, was 8,500. The enemy is estimated at 12,000 or more. About 3,000 prisoners, 4,000 or 5,000 stands of arms, and 43 pieces of artillery are taken. By the accompanying return, I regret to find our losses more severe than at first supposed, amounting in the two days to 33 officers and 398 men--in all, 431, of whom 63 were killed. The enemy's loss if computed to be from 1,000 to 1,200. [Winfield Scott's Supplemental Report, April 23, 1847.]

Mansfield observed:

"Ten thousand men made prisoners of war, 700 splendid cannon, 10,000 stands of arms, 30,000 shells and shot, were the spoils of the triumphant victories which had attended the American Army in a campaign of only two months." [Mansfield, Edwin D.  op. cit., at p 201.]

After Cerro Gordo, there was nothing to prevent General Scott from marching to the capital. But for reasons which he considered good and sufficient, he decided upon a different course; among these were the numerical weakness of his Army, the fact that several regiments of volunteers were about to be discharged, thus reducing his strength still further, and the fact that supplies and reinforcements which he had confidently expected were not forthcoming. Leaving garrisons in Vera Cruz, Jalapa, and the castle of Perote, he advanced with the main Army to Puebla, where, on the 1st of June, his entire force numbered only 5,000 effective men. The reinforcements that reached Vera Cruz and all the garrisons, excepting those of Vera Cruz and Perote, were concentrated at Puebla, at which point there were assembled on August 6 about 14,000 men. The sick in hospitals at Puebla and the necessary garrison for that place aggregated 3,261 men. Thus, by abandoning his line of communications, General Scott was able to advance with 10,738 men, half of them volunteers, to attack 30,000 men behind powerful works, supplied with abundant artillery. Without doubt he had staked everything on the chance of success.

The March to Mexico City
The march upon the capital began August 7, and on the 13th the army was assembled 15 miles from that city at and in the vicinity of Ayotla. From this point three roads led to the city; and in exploring the most direct one, the Dragoons and Mounted Rifles, escorting General [Persifor F.] Smith and Engineers, took such liberties with the powerful and heavily garrisoned works of El Pe¤on and Mexicalcingo that General Scott pronounced this "the boldest reconnaissance of the war".

It was finally decided to advance by the road south of Lake Chalco to San Augustin, which place was seized August 17, and next day the entire army had arrived in that vicinity.

Within 5 miles of San Augustin were the strong posts of San Antonio and Contreras; the former on the direct road to the capital, very strong and nearly inaccessible excepting by way of a narrow causeway flanked by deep ditches; the latter on the treat road from Acapulco to Mexico, also very strong, well fortified, armed with 22 cannon and occupied by General Valencia with 7,000 veterans, said to be the flower of the Mexican army. It was decided to mask San Antonio and to attack Contreras.

A path having been made passable through the pedrigal or field of lava, the brigade of Gen. [Persifor F.] Smith was on August 19 directed against Contreras and drove in the enemy's cavalry, skirmishers and advanced posts, but did not attack the main work. Two light batteries, brought forward with great difficulty, were opened against the enemy's works, but after a severe contest they were silenced. Leaving the guns supported by several companies of infantry (later reinforced by two regiments of [Franklin] Pierce's brigade) before the works, General Smith moved the remainder of his brigade to the right upon San Geronimo, to cut Contreras off from the capital and also from communication with Santa Ana, who with 12,000 men had advanced to support Valencia, and who ultimately approached to within 2,000 yard of his works.

The brigade of General Smith was reinforced by those of Riley and [George] Cadwalader, and all three were at San Geronimo, interposed between Valencia and Santa Ana, before dark. The brigade of Shields was toiling through the pedrigal and joined the others during the night. The light batteries, having suffered severely, were withdrawn out of range. The situation at this time would seem to have called for immediate and vigorous action of some sort on the part of the enemy. It is asserted by some that the Mexicans did not know the movements of their enemy; but this would seem incredible. Be that as it may, General Valencia spent the precious moments in writing a very extravagant report of his "victory" and in "conferring brevets upon his officers."

Most of the night, which was rainy and very dark, was spent by the Engineer officers in searching for a possible route to the rear of the enemy's works. The movement began at 3 o'clock a.m. on the 20th, with Riley's brigade in the lead. The brigade of Shields remained at San Geronimo to withstand any movement of Santa Ana. The other three brigades did not finish their movement until long after daylight. Yet they remained undiscovered until they were almost ready to assault, the enemy's attention being more particularly devoted to the troops still occupying the first position, near Padierna.

At about 6:30 a.m. Valencia's position was assaulted in rear and on both flanks, and in a few minutes his entire force was utterly routed and "totally destroyed as a military body".

"I doubt whether a more brilliant or decisive victory--taking into view ground, artificial defenses, batteries, and the extreme disparity of numbers, without cavalry or artillery on our side is to be found on record. Including all our corps directed against the intrenched camp, with Shields's brigade at the hamlet, we positively did not have over 4,500 rank and file, and we know by sight, and more certainly by many captured documents and letters, that the enemy had actually engaged on the spot 7,000 with at least 12,000 more hovering within sight and striking distance, both on the 19th and 20th.

"All not killed or captured now fled with precipitation. Thus was the great victory of Contreras achieved; our road to the capital opened; 700 of the enemy killed; 813 prisoners, including 88 officers, 4 generals, besides various colors and standards 22 pieces of brass ordnance, half of large caliber, thousands of small arms and accouterments, an immense quantity of shot and shell, powder and cartridges, 700 pack mules and many horses--all in our hands." [General Scott's Report.]

Two of these guns were Santa Ana's trophies from the field of Buena Vista. They had been "lost without dishonor" by a battery of 4th Artillery, Captain O'Brien, at Buena Vista. They were now "recovered with glory" by Capt. Simon Drum's battery of the same regiment.

The fortified post of San Antonio, the bridge head of Churubusco, and the fortified convent of San Pablo adjacent were all captured after hard fighting on the same day. While the battle of Churubusco was in progress the brigades of Shields and [Franklin] Pierce were sent by the commanding general to attack the Mexican reserves in rear of the lines of Churubusco. The resulting combat, called the "battle of Portales", was very severe for a time, but terminated in the fifth American victory on that memorable 20th of August.

"So terminated the series of events which I have but feebly presented. My thanks were freely poured out on the different field to the abilities and services of generals and other officers, to the zeal and prowess of all, the rank and file included. But a reward infinitely higher, the applause of a grateful country and Government, will, I can not doubt, be accorded in due time to such merit of every sort displayed by this glorious army, which has now overcome all difficulties, distance, climate, ground, fortifications, and numbers.

"It has in a single day in many battles as often defeated 32,000 men, made about 3,000 prisoners, including 8 generals, two of them ex-Presidents, and 205 other officers; killed and wounded 4,000 of all ranks, besides entire corps dispersed and dissolved; captured 37 pieces of ordnance, more than trebling our siege train and field batteries, with a large number of small arms and a full supply of ammunition of every kind. These great results have overwhelmed the enemy. Our loss amounts to 1,053; 139, including 16 officers, were killed; 876, with 60 officers were wounded.

"After so many victories, we might with but little additional loss have occupied the capital the same evening.

"I halted our victorious corps at the gates of the city, at least for a time, and have them now quartered."
[ibid.]

Negotiations were undertaken, but failed, and operations were resumed on the 7th of September. Next day occurred the battle of Molino del Rey, in which 3,250 Americans defeated 14,000 Mexicans, who occupied a very powerful line of works, flanked by the fire of the castle of Chapultepec. Four thousand lancers, the finest cavalry in the world, were completely bluffed and intimidated by Major Sumner with 270 dragoons, and they took no part in the battle except that of spectators. The enemy was driven from his works with heavy losses, including all his artillery and 800 prisoners; but, as at Buena Vista, Santa Ana proclaimed a great victory won by himself a "victory" the anniversary of which is celebrated in Mexico to this day.

After the destruction of the powerful stone works of Molino del Rey, including the Casa Mata Fort, there still remained between the American army and the capital only the Castle of Chapultepec. This renowned fortress was battered all day on September 12 and next morning was carried by assault. The Belen and San Cosmo causeways and gates were captured in the afternoon of the same day.

On September 14 the city was occupied with little opposition, and, although minor operations continued for a time, the war was practically at an end.

Molino del Rey and Chapultepec
Among those who were breveted for gallantry in the severe battles of Molino del Rey and Chapultepec was 2d Lieut. [Ulysses S.] Grant, of the 4th Infantry.

"At the end of another series of arduous and brilliant operations of more than forty-eight hours' continuance this glorious army hoisted, on the morning of the 14th, the colors of the United States on the walls of this palace."
[Winfield Scott's Report written at the National Palace of Mexico, September 18, 1847.]

"The victory of the 8th at the Molino del Rey was followed by daring reconnaissances on the part of our distinguished Engineers Captain [Robert E.] Lee, Lieutenants [Pierre G. T.] Beauregard, Stevens, and [Zealous B.] Tower. Their operations were directed principally to the south--toward the gates of the Piedad, San Angel (Mino Perdido), San Antonio, and the Paseo de la Viga.

"This city stands on a slight swell of ground, near the center of an irregular basin, and is girdled by a ditch in its greater extent a navigable canal of great breadth and depth very difficult to bridge in the presence of an enemy, and serving at once for drainage, custom-house purposes, and military defense, leaving eight entrances or gates over arches, each of which we found defended by a system of strong works that seemed to require nothing but some men and guns to be impregnable.

"Outside and within the cross fires of those gates we found to the south other obstacles but little less formidable.

". . .After a close personal survey of the southern gates, covered by Pillow's division and Riley's brigade of [David E.] Twiggs' with four times our numbers concentrated in our immediate front I determined on the 11th to avoid that network of obstacles, and to seek by a sudden diversion to the southwest and west less unfavorable approached.

". . .The stratagem against the south was admirably executed throughout the 12th and down to the afternoon of the 13th, when it was too late for the enemy to recover from the effects of his delusion. The first step in the new movement was to carry Chapultepec, a natural and isolated mound, of great elevation, strongly fortified at its base, on its acclivities, and heights.

". . .In the course of the same night (that of the 11th) heavy batteries, within easy ranges, were established. No. 1, on our right, under the command of Captain [Richard C.] Drum, 4th Artillery (relieved late next day, for some hours, by Lieutenant Andrews of the 3d), and No. 2, commanded by Lieutenant [Peter V.] Hagner, Ordnance both supported by [John A.] Quitman's division. No. 3 and 4 on the opposite side, supported by Pillows' division, were commanded, the former by Captain [William T. H.] Brooks and Lieut. [Samuel S.] Anderson, 2d Artillery, alternately, and the latter by Lieutenant [Charles P.] Stone, Ordnance. The batteries were traced by Captain [Benjamin] Huger and Captain [Robert E.] Lee, engineer, and constructed by them with the able assistance of the young officers of those corps and the artillery.

". . .The bombardment and cannonade, under the direction of Captain [Benjamin] Huger, were commenced early in the morning of the 12th."

Here follows a description of the storm of Chapultepec. The report resumes:

"The following are the officers and corps most distinguished in those brilliant operations: The Voltigeur regiment, in two detachments, commanded, respectively, by Colonel Andrews and Lieutenant-Colonel [Joseph E. Johnston], the latter mostly in the lead . . . the storming party of Worth's division under Captain McKenzie, 2d Artillery, with Lieutenant Selden, 8th Infantry, early on the ladder and badly wounded; Lieutenant Armistead, 6th Infantry, the first to leap into a ditch to plant a ladder; Lieutenants Rodgers, of the 4th and J. P. Smith, of the 5th Infantry both mortally wounded; the 9th Infantry, under Colonel Ransom, who was killed while gallantly leading that gallant regiment; the 15th Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard and Major [Samuel] Woods . . . .Colonel Clarke's brigade (Worth's division), consisting of the 5th, 8th, and 6th Regiments of Infantry, commanded, respectively, by Captain Chapman, Major Montgomery, and Lieut. Edward Johnson, the latter specially noticed, with Lieutenants [James] Longstreet (badly wounded, advancing, colors in hand), Pickett, and Merchant, the last three of the 8th Infantry . . . . and another detachment, a portion of the storming party (Twiggs' division, serving with [John A.] Quitman), under Lieutenant [William] Steele, 2d Infantry, after the fall of Lieutenant Gantt, 7th Infantry.

"In this connection it is but just to recall the decisive effect of the heavy batteries Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, commanded by those excellent officers Captain [Richard C.] Drum, 4th Artillery, assisted by Lieutenants Benjamin and [Fitz John] Porter, of his own company; Captain [Horace] Brooks and Lieutenant [Samuel S.] Anderson, 2d Artillery, assisted by Lieutenant Russell, 4th Infantry, a volunteer; Lieutenants [Peter V.] Hagner and [Charles P.] Stone, of the Ordnance, and Lieutenant Andrews, 3d Artillery, the whole superintended by Captain [Benjamin] Huger, Chief of Ordnance with this army, an officer distinguished by every kind of merit. The mountain howitzer battery, under Lieutenant [Jesse L.] Reno of the Ordnance, deserves also to be particularly mentioned. Attached to the Voltigeurs, it followed the movements of that regiment and again won applause.

"In adding to the list of individuals of conspicuous merit I must limit myself to a few of the many names which might be enumerated: Captain [Joseph L.] Hooker assistant adjutant-general, who won special applause successively in the staffs of Pillow and [George] Cadwalader; Lieutenant [Mansfield] Lovell, 4th Artillery (wounded), chief of [John A.] Quitman's staff; Captain [Francis N.] Page, assistant adjutant-general (wounded), and Lieutenant [Richard P.] Hammond, 3d Artillery, both of [Hamilton L.] Shield's staff, and Lieutenant [Earl] Van Dorn (7th Infantry), aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General [Persifor F.] Smith.

"These operations all occurred on the west, southeast, and heights of Chapultepec. To the north and at the base of the mound, inaccessible on that side, the 11th Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel [Paul O.] Hébert; the 14th, under Colonel Trousdale, and Captain [John B.] Magruder's field battery, 1st Artillery one section advanced under Lieutenant Jackson all of Pillow's division had at the same time some spirited affairs against superior numbers, driving the enemy from a battery in the road and capturing a gun. In these the officers and corps named gained merited praise.

". . .Here (at the Belen Gate) of the heavy battery (4th Artillery) Captain Drum and Lieutenant Benjamin were mortally wounded and Lieutenant [Fitz John] Porter, its third in rank, slightly. The loss of these two most distinguished officers the Army will long mourn.

". . .The capital, however, was not taken by any one or two corps, but by the talent, the science, the gallantry, the prowess of this entire army.

". . .And I reassert, upon accumulated and unquestionable evidence, that in not one of those conflicts (the battles in the Valley of Mexico) was this army opposed by fewer than three and a half times its numbers--in several of them by a yet greater excess.

". . .In conclusion I beg to enumerate once more, with due commendation and thanks, the distinguished staff officers, general and personal, who, in our last operations in front of the enemy, accompanied me and communicated orders to every point and through every danger. Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcock, acting Inspector-General; Major [William] Turnbull and Lieutenant [Edmund L.] Hardcastle, Topographical Engineers; Major [Edmund] Kirby, Chief Paymaster; Captain [James R.] Irwin, Chief Quartermaster; Captain [John B.] Grayson, Chief Commissary; Capt. [Henry L.] Scott, Chief in the Adjutant-General's Department; Lieutenant Williams, Aid-de-camp; Lieutenant [George W.] Lay, Military Secretary; Major J. P. Gaines, Kentucky Cavalry volunteer Aide-de-camp; Captain [Robert E.] Lee, so constantly distinguished, also bore important orders from me (September 13) until he fainted from a wound and the loss of two nights' sleep at the batteries. Lieutenants [Pierre G. T.] Beauregard, Stevens, and [Zealous B.] Tower, all wounded, were employed with the divisions, and Lieuts. [Gustavus W.] Smith and [George B.] McClellan with the company of Sappers and Miners. Those five lieutenants of Engineers, like their captain, won the admiration of all about them. The Ordnance officers, Captain [Benjamin] Huger, Lieutenants [Peter V.] Hagner, [Charles P.] Stone, and [Jesse L.] Reno, were highly effective and distinguished at the several batteries; and I must add that Captain [Justus] McKinstry, assistant quartermaster, at the close of the operations executed several important commissions for me as a special volunteer."

During the action in front of the San Cosmo Gate, Captain [Horace] Brooks, in command of a detachment of the 2d Artillery, and Lieut. [Ulysses S.] Grant, with a detachment of the 4th Infantry, attacked and, after a very hard fight, carried a breastwork defended by a large force of the enemy. To hasten this result it was necessary to bring forward a piece of artillery along the causeway swept by the enemy's fire. This was done by Lieut. [Henry Jackson] Hunt, 2d Artillery, whose detachment lost more than half its numbers; but the move was decisive.

Of this incident General [William J.] Worth, the division commander, said in his report: "It has never been my fortune to witness a more brilliant exhibition of courage and conduct."

Some of the most furious combats of the war were among those of the minor expeditions. The following will serve as a specimen:

"On the morning of the 6th (December, 1846) Kearny's command met and defeated at San Pasqual, about 40 miles from San Diego, a body of Mexicans under Gen. Andreas Pico. Kearny had at this time about 300 men, composed of Companies B and C, 1st Dragoons, and volunteers. The action was severe, the 1st Dragoons losing 3 officers -- Captains Moore and Johnston and Lieutenant Hammond--and 14 men killed, and about all the dragoons were wounded, principally with lance thrusts. General Kearny himself received two wounds; Lieutenant Warner, of the Topographical Engineers, three; and Captain Gillespie, of the volunteers, three. Kearny was compelled to remain at San Bernardino until the 11th on account of wounds, but reached and occupied San Diego December 12."
[Wainwright, Capt. R. P. P.  Historical Sketch of the 1st U. S. Cavalry.]